California Family Code § 4320 – Factors to be Considered in Ordering Spousal Support

Plain-Language Summary

California Family Code § 4320 provides a comprehensive list of factors that courts must evaluate when deciding the amount and duration of spousal support. In simple terms, these factors guide judges to ensure any support order is fair and considers each spouse’s situation. Below is an overview of the key spousal support factors under Section 4320:

Earning Capacity of Each Spouse: The court looks at how capable each party is of earning enough to maintain the standard of living they had during the marriage. This includes evaluating the supported spouse’s marketable job skills, the current job market for those skills, and how much time or training might be needed for them to acquire or update skills if they’ve been out of the workforce.
Contributions to Other’s Career or Education: If one spouse helped the other gain an education, training, career position, or professional license, that contribution is considered. For example, a spouse who financially supported the other through school or career training may receive greater support in return to acknowledge that investment.
Ability to Pay: The court examines the paying spouse’s ability to afford spousal support. This factor accounts for the paying spouse’s own earning capacity, income from all sources, assets, and expenses, ensuring any support amount is reasonable given what they can actually pay.
Each Party’s Financial Needs: The needs of each spouse are assessed relative to the standard of living established during the marriage. In other words, the court determines what each person reasonably needs to live on (housing, food, bills, etc.) to keep a lifestyle close to what they had while married.
Assets and Obligations: The court considers what each party owns and owes. This includes both community property and each spouse’s separate assets and debts. A spouse with substantial separate assets or very little debt might need less support, whereas a spouse carrying significant debt or having fewer assets may need more help.
Duration of the Marriage: Generally, the longer the marriage lasted, the longer the supported spouse may receive support. A short marriage might lead to support only for a brief, transitional period, whereas a marriage of long duration (often 10 years or more) could result in support orders with no fixed end date at the outset.
Impact of Children on Employment: If the supported spouse has primary custody of young children, the court considers whether working would interfere with childcare responsibilities. Essentially, if taking a job would be difficult because of the need to care for the children, the court may lean toward a higher or longer support award to allow the custodial parent to be home with the kids.
Age and Health of the Parties: The ages and health conditions of both spouses are important factors. An older or ill spouse who has limited ability to work might be granted more support or support for a longer time. Conversely, a younger, healthy spouse is generally expected to become self-sufficient sooner.
History of Domestic Violence: Any documented history of domestic violence between the spouses (including abuse toward either spouse or the children) is taken into account. Evidence that one spouse abused the other can influence the support decision – courts do not want to reward an abuser at the expense of the victim. The emotional trauma suffered by the victim may also be factored in when determining an appropriate support amount.
Criminal Conviction of an Abusive Spouse: If one spouse has been criminally convicted of domestic violence against the other, the law presumes that the abusive spouse should not receive spousal support from the victim. In practice, a spouse who was abusive and got convicted will likely be denied any support, or their support rights will be significantly reduced, unless they can overcome this presumption in court.
Tax Consequences: The court looks at the immediate tax impacts of a spousal support order on each party. (For instance, under current federal law, spousal support payments are not tax-deductible for the payer nor taxable as income for the recipient, which affects how much money each party actually retains.) Both sides’ tax situations are considered when setting a fair support amount.
Balance of Hardships: The court weighs the relative financial hardships of each party. The goal is to make sure the support order isn’t unduly hard on either side – for example, the paying spouse shouldn’t be left unable to pay their own bills, but the supported spouse also shouldn’t be left unable to meet basic needs. The judge tries to strike a balance so that neither party faces extreme financial hardship after the divorce.
Goal of Self-Support: California law encourages the supported spouse to become self-supporting within a “reasonable period” of time. As a general guideline, for marriages under 10 years, this reasonable period is often about half the length of the marriage. However, in a long-term marriage or other special circumstances, the court has discretion to order support for a shorter or longer duration as appropriate.
Any Other Factors: Finally, the court can consider any other factors it deems just and equitable. This catch-all provision lets the judge account for unique circumstances in the case that might not fall neatly under the other listed factors, ensuring the support decision is fair given the specific facts of the situation.

Real-World Examples

Here are a few hypothetical scenarios to illustrate how courts might apply some of these factors in practice:

Short Marriage vs. Long Marriage: Imagine a couple that was married for only 4 years. A judge might order spousal support for around 2 years (roughly half the length of the marriage) to help the lower-earning spouse get back on their feet. In contrast, if the couple was married for 20 years, the court may not set an end date for support initially. In a long-term marriage like that, support could continue indefinitely (subject to future modification) because the supported spouse may have a much harder time becoming self-sufficient after such a long period out of the full-time workforce.
Income Disparity: Consider a scenario where one spouse earns a high salary and the other spouse has very little income. The court will likely order the higher-earning spouse to pay significant spousal support so that both parties can maintain a standard of living closer to what they had during the marriage. For example, if one spouse left the workforce for years to raise children while the other advanced their career, the working spouse might be required to pay more support. This helps the supported spouse catch up financially and accounts for the contributions they made (such as childcare and homemaking) that enabled the other spouse’s career success.
Domestic Violence Impact: Suppose a husband was found to have physically abused his wife during the marriage, and he was later convicted of domestic violence. In this situation, the court would factor in that abuse very strongly when deciding spousal support. The abusive husband would be presumed not entitled to receive any spousal support from the wife. If the wife is the one seeking support, the court could even lean toward awarding her additional support given the emotional distress and challenges she endured due to the abuse. Essentially, a spouse who commits domestic violence risks losing spousal support rights, while the victim’s need for support is viewed with greater sympathy.

Published Case Law on § 4320

4320(a)

In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469 – Defined the marital standard of living as the “general station in life” enjoyed during the marriage, meant as a general reference point rather than a precise dollar amount. The court emphasized that this standard is just one factor under § 4320(a) and that spousal support may be set higher or lower than what would exactly maintain that lifestyle in order to reach a fair, just result.
In re Marriage of Weinstein (1991) 4 Cal.App.4th 555 – Held that a court is not required to sustain an extravagant marital lifestyle that was beyond the parties’ means (in this case, one “based heavily on borrowing”) when determining support. Instead, the court may use a reasonable measure (such as average marital income) to assess the standard of living, rather than obligating the supporting spouse to fund an over-extended lifestyle.
In re Marriage of Watt (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 340 – Cautioned against relying solely on a “deliberately depressed” marital standard of living when awarding support. Where the couple lived frugally (e.g. due to one spouse pursuing education), the court must recognize that the low lifestyle was temporary; a support order should account for the supporting spouse’s absence from the workforce and not deny reasonable support just because the post-separation living expenses haven’t dropped.
In re Marriage of Simpson (1992) 4 Cal.4th 225 – The California Supreme Court ruled that “earning capacity” as a support factor should be based on an objectively reasonable work regimen rather than an extraordinary one. A supporting spouse who worked unusually long hours during the marriage should not be locked into that excessive workload after divorce to maintain the marital standard of living; the court should instead assess what the spouse can reasonably earn on a normal schedule.
In re Marriage of Smith (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 74 – Clarified that a spouse’s “earning capacity” cannot be used to impute income for support unless the evidence shows the spouse has both the ability and the opportunity to work. In other words, it is an abuse of discretion to base support on earning capacity when a party lacks marketable skills, jobs available to them, or other means to actually attain the imputed income.

4320(b)

In re Marriage of Rosan (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 885 – Reversed a trial court’s minimal, time-limited support award as an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeal emphasized that a supported spouse’s substantial contributions to the marriage and the other spouse’s career must be considered in setting spousal support, rather than automatically terminating support before the supported spouse becomes self-sufficient.
In re Marriage of Fransen (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 419 – The appellate court overturned a spousal support order (only $70 per month after a long marriage) for failing to apply the required statutory factors. It instructed that the trial judge must weigh all factors in former Civil Code §4801(a) (now Fam. Code §4320), including the extent to which the wife had contributed to the husband’s lengthy military career, to reach a just and reasonable support award.
In re Marriage of Watt (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 340 – Held that a supporting spouse’s contributions to the other spouse’s education and career – even covering ordinary living expenses while the other obtained a degree – must be fully factored into spousal support. The court read the spousal support statute broadly, finding the wife’s support of the husband through medical school (by working and paying living expenses) was a significant contribution that the trial court should have weighed when determining support under what is now §4320(b).
In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 351 – On remand of a support modification, the Court of Appeal stressed that in a long-term marriage the trial court must consider the supported spouse’s role in the other’s career success. Here, after 23 years of marriage, the wife’s indirect contributions (managing the household and raising children) were relevant under §4320(b). The appellate court found error in a support order that didn’t adequately reflect those contributions, and it required a reevaluation of spousal support in light of all §4320 factors.
In re Marriage of Weiner (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 235 – Addressed the interplay between the education reimbursement statute and spousal support. The court held that Family Code §2641 (reimbursement for community-funded education costs) does apply even to premarital student loans paid during marriage, and it reversed a trial court’s order of full reimbursement. In doing so, the opinion noted that any remaining effect of one spouse’s education on the parties’ circumstances (e.g. enhanced earning capacity) should be considered under §4320(b) when setting or modifying spousal support, after accounting for any reimbursement.

4320(c)

In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) – The California Supreme Court held that after a 26-year marriage in which the wife had not worked for 15 years due to homemaking duties, the trial court abused its discretion by terminating spousal support jurisdiction after a short period. The court emphasized that a supported spouse’s sacrifice of career opportunities to devote time to domestic responsibilities must be considered. Absent evidence the wife would become self-supporting by the end date, support should not automatically end.
In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) – The Court of Appeal affirmed an order requiring a husband to pay combined child and spousal support that left him with only 17% of his after-tax income, noting the wife had been a stay-at-home mother of three children. The trial court properly considered that the wife’s earning capacity was impaired by years spent on domestic duties. The appellate court approved the trial court’s reliance on the Family Code § 4320 factors (including the supported spouse’s unemployment for domestic duties and the needs of the children) rather than a temporary support formula. This case underscores that a spouse who left the workforce to raise children is not expected to immediately earn an income comparable to the supporting spouse’s.
In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) – The Court of Appeal discussed the § 4320(a)(2) factor (time spent unemployed for domestic duties) in a high-asset divorce. The supported spouse argued her opera career suffered because of family obligations. The trial court, however, found no evidence that her role as homemaker and primary caretaker curtailed her career. The appellate court affirmed, explaining that although § 4320(c) (factor (a)(2) in practice) requires weighing a spouse’s sacrifice of career for domestic duties, in this case the wife had continued performing and working part-time, so the court did not abuse its discretion in giving that factor little weight. Cheriton shows that the impact of domestic duties on earning capacity must be supported by evidence.
In re Marriage of Ficke (2013) – In this case, a mother had sacrificed a high-paying career and was the 95% custodial parent of two teenagers. The trial court imputed a large income to her (despite her minimal actual earnings) and even ordered her to pay spousal support to the father, resulting in a net reduction of funds available for the children. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that imputing income to a custodial parent must not harm the children’s interests. It found no showing that forcing the stay-at-home mother to work full-time was in the children’s best interest, and noted that any spousal support order cannot undercut child support priorities. The decision underscores that when a spouse has foregone career advancement to care for children, courts will be cautious about imputing income or shifting support obligations in a way that penalizes that domestic contribution.

4320(d)

In re Marriage of McElwee (1988) – The Court of Appeal upheld termination of spousal support where the supported wife had received nearly $500,000 in assets from the divorce but “made a series of imprudent, high risk investments” yielding minimal income. The court ruled that if a spouse’s separate assets were sufficient to meet her needs but were mismanaged, the court may reduce or terminate support.
In re Marriage of Terry (2000) – The supported spouse (wife) in this case had an investment portfolio, real estate, and retirement funds totaling several million dollars. The appellate court held that her separate estate was ample to provide for her own support, so spousal support should be terminated, requiring her to draw from her own assets for living expenses. The court emphasized that in determining sufficiency of a separate estate under §4320(d), it is proper to consider not just actual income but the reasonable income potential and total value of the assets – even those obtained in the property division.
In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) – The trial court’s spousal support award was reversed in part because it failed to consider the supporting husband’s extraordinary wealth from stock options (valued around $45 million). The Court of Appeal instructed that a spouse’s ability to pay **must** include consideration of assets and unearned income, not just salary. In other words, the husband’s substantial separate property and investments had to be factored into his capacity to pay spousal support.
In re Marriage of de Guigne (2002) – In this high-asset case, the husband’s only income was about $240,000/year from investments and trusts, but he owned a $25–30 million inherited estate (a 47-acre mansion property). The trial court ordered child and spousal support far exceeding his income, effectively requiring him to liquidate or borrow against his separate property. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the husband’s extensive separate-property holdings and “special circumstances” justified deviating from guidelines – his support obligations could be based on the income that *could* be generated from his assets (for example, by selling part of the estate), rather than the low income the assets actually produced.

4320(e)

In re Marriage of Smith (1990) – The Court of Appeal acknowledged that a supported spouse may legitimately refrain from employment to care for young children. It noted that spousal support can be ordered for a period to allow a custodial parent to remain home until the children reach an appropriate age for the parent to return to work. This case confirms § 4320’s policy that childcare responsibilities temper the expectation of immediate self-support.
In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) – In this landmark case, the court held that supported spouses are expected to become self-supporting within a “reasonable period” of time, absent circumstances preventing work. Known as the “Gavron warning,” it emphasizes that it is in the best interests of both spouses and society that the supported party make diligent efforts toward self-sufficiency. Family Code § 4320(e) (now § 4320(g)) reflects this principle but makes clear a spouse’s earning capacity is assessed in light of childcare: a parent is not required to seek employment that would unduly interfere with raising dependent children.
In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) – Here, a noncustodial father challenged a support order that consumed over 80% of his income. The appellate court reversed because the trial judge had relied on a temporary support formula instead of weighing each § 4320 factor for a permanent order. The decision underscores that courts must individually evaluate the supported party’s circumstances – including her ability or inability to work while caring for the children – rather than using automated calculations. Schulze reinforced that a custodial parent’s child-rearing duties must be considered when setting long-term spousal support.
In re Marriage of LaBass & Munsee (1997) – The court in LaBass firmly applied the § 4320(e) principle about child care. In that case, the trial court had imputed income to a mother of an infant for support calculations, assuming she could work full-time. The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that forcing the supported spouse to work when she had a baby at home would “unduly interfere” with the child’s interests. This case illustrates that a supported parent’s earning capacity cannot be considered in isolation; the demands of caring for a very young child can justify reduced or delayed employment.
In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) – Although decided under the Civil Code predecessor to § 4320, this California Supreme Court decision is frequently cited for the principles now embodied in § 4320. The court held that judges must consider “practically everything which has a legitimate bearing” on the parties’ lives when setting support. In Morrison, after a 20-year marriage in which the wife had been a full-time homemaker (raising children), the trial court’s order terminating spousal support after a few years was overturned. The Supreme Court emphasized that support should not automatically end without evidence the supported spouse can work without harming her children’s well-being. This case cemented the rule later codified in § 4320(g): spousal support orders must account for the supported party’s child-rearing responsibilities when evaluating their ability to engage in gainful employment.

4320(f)

In re Marriage of Heistermann (1991) – The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s termination of spousal support for a 58-year-old disabled wife after an 8.9-year marriage. The lower court had attempted to shift her support to “society,” but the appellate court held that was improper without a true change in circumstances. This case highlights that the supported spouse’s advanced age and poor health (permanent disability) must be considered, and such conditions can warrant continued support despite a relatively short marriage.
In re Marriage of Reynolds (1998) – This case established that a supporting spouse has an **absolute right to retire at age 65** without being forced to keep working to pay spousal support. The husband (a 67-year-old doctor) retired after losing his job and sought to reduce support. The Court of Appeal agreed that no one can be compelled to work beyond the customary retirement age to fulfill a support order. In applying § 4320(f), the court recognized the supporting party’s age and health as legitimate factors: once reaching retirement age in good faith, a reduced ability to earn is expected and support should be adjusted accordingly.
In re Marriage of Dietz (2009) – Here, the husband argued that his ex-wife’s turning 62 (making her eligible to draw from retirement accounts) and the growth of those assets were a “change of circumstances” justifying lower support. The Court of Appeal disagreed and reversed a support reduction. Because the divorce judgment had anticipated the wife’s retirement funds and she remained unable to work due to medical issues, her age and health status did not present a new circumstance warranting modification. Dietz underscores that simply reaching retirement age (or access to retirement funds) is not automatic grounds to cut support – the court must weigh the supported spouse’s actual needs and health, consistent with § 4320(f).
In re Marriage of Shimkus (2016) – The Court of Appeal in this case recognized that “normal retirement age” can depend on the profession. The supporting spouse (a firefighter) retired at 61, which the court deemed equivalent to a typical retirement at 65 because firefighters often retire younger due to the job’s physical demands. Shimkus held the husband’s retirement was not “early” and that his age/health justified his decision to stop working. However, the ruling also cautioned that a payor’s retirement *alone* doesn’t automatically terminate spousal support – the trial court must still consider **all** § 4320 factors (including the supported spouse’s age, health, and income, such as her share of the pension) before deciding whether to reduce or end support.
In re Marriage of McLain (2017) – This published decision squarely addressed the “age and health” factor in setting long-term support. The divorcing couple were 68 (husband) and 66 (wife), both already retired. The trial court ordered the husband to pay spousal support and refused to impute any income to the retired wife. The Court of Appeal affirmed, emphasizing that Family Code § 4320(f) requires courts to account for the parties’ ages and health. The opinion noted that there comes a point where people “commonly stop working,” and that a supported spouse of retirement age may not be expected to become self-supporting. McLain confirms that a supported party’s age and good-faith retirement can outweigh the usual goal of self-sufficiency, meaning older spouses in decent health have a right to remain retired while still receiving appropriate support.

4320(g)

In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1 – The Court of Appeal held that permanent spousal support must be determined using the statutory factors (now in § 4320), rather than a temporary support formula. This includes considering the immediate and specific tax consequences of support (e.g. the deductibility for the payor and taxability for the payee) when evaluating each party’s net income and ability to pay.
In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519 – The appellate court reversed a support order because the trial judge failed to account for tax consequences on imputed income. The trial court had labeled certain benefits “nontaxable,” which inflated the payor’s disposable income and support. The Court of Appeal ruled this was error and emphasized that § 4320(g) requires weighing actual tax liabilities – support must be set based on after-tax net income, giving the payor credit for taxes on any income imputed for support.
In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921 – In modifying a long-term spousal support order, the court carefully evaluated the tax implications of the supported wife’s substantial investment portfolio. The husband argued she could sell assets to generate income, and the court noted that doing so would trigger capital gains taxes (albeit at recently reduced rates). Under § 4320(g), the appellate court approved the trial court’s consideration of those immediate tax consequences (the tax cost of reconfiguring investments) when deciding how much support to require and whether the wife should be expected to invade her principal.
In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191 – This decision explicitly affirmed that under § 4320(g) the trial court “must consider” the tax consequences to each party in setting spousal support. In Ackerman, the wife claimed the judge ignored tax factors, but the Court of Appeal found the record showed the opposite – the trial judge had properly weighed each party’s tax liabilities (for example, taxes due on rental and investment income) in determining a just support amount. Because the tax consequences were accounted for, the support award was upheld as a proper exercise of discretion.
In re Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438 – The Blazer court applied § 4320(g) by ensuring the support decision was based on the parties’ net incomes after taxes. For example, the wife’s financial expert testified – and the trial court agreed – that if the wife had to withdraw funds from retirement accounts or sell real estate to support herself, the resulting tax liabilities (estimated around 40% on those transactions) must be considered. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in the support order, noting that the trial court had appropriately factored in the immediate tax consequences to each party when assessing ability to pay and need for support.

4320(h)

In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921 – The court reaffirmed that trial courts must consider all spousal support factors – including the balance of hardships to each party – when modifying support. In this case, the payor husband’s income had dropped and the payee wife had substantial investments, so the trial court reduced support after finding that the prior order left the husband unable to meet his own living expenses. Balancing the hardships, the reduction was deemed proper because the wife’s assets could cover her needs while the original support level imposed undue hardship on the husband.
In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269 – The appellate court held that a trial judge must weigh the relative hardships to each party as part of the §4320 analysis. In Cheriton, the supported spouse’s post-divorce living standard was far below that of the supporting spouse (a high earner), and the court noted that on remand the disparity in living standards should be considered under §4320(h). In other words, the spouse’s need to avoid a severe drop in standard of living should be balanced against the supporting party’s ability to pay when determining a just spousal support amount.
In re Marriage of de Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353 – This case involved an extremely wealthy spouse ordered to pay spousal support that exceeded his annual income, requiring him to dip into principal assets. The Court of Appeal upheld the order (with minor modifications), finding no abuse of discretion in light of the parties’ opulent marital lifestyle and the husband’s substantial wealth. The court implicitly balanced the hardships: even though the husband had to liquidate assets (a hardship to him), the supported wife’s need to maintain something close to the marital standard of living was given greater weight because of the husband’s ability to pay from his extensive separate property resources.
In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43 – In Schmir, a long-term support order was terminated after the supported wife (who had been unemployed for years) became able to work and reached an age to draw retirement income. The court ruled that once the supported spouse could meet her own financial needs – for example, by utilizing investment income and employment – the balance of hardships no longer favored her. However, the decision also emphasized that a supported spouse must be given fair warning and time to become self-sufficient (a “Gavron warning”) before support is ended. In essence, the court applied §4320(h) by concluding that continuing support was not equitable when the wife’s potential hardships had been mitigated by her newfound earning ability and access to funds, especially after she had been adequately notified to prepare for self-support.
In re Marriage of Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1225 – The Shaughnessy court affirmed a step-down and termination of spousal support in a 15-year marriage. Notably, the trial court initially found that the “balance of hardships” factor favored the supported wife (meaning she would suffer more hardship without support than the husband would by paying it). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that spousal support should not continue indefinitely absent incapacitating circumstances. The wife’s failure to become self-supporting constituted a material change, and despite her hardship, the court found it fair to reduce and eventually end support. This case illustrates that §4320(h)’s hardship assessment is important but is weighed alongside other factors – here, the policy that a supported spouse is expected to become self-sufficient – in determining the duration and amount of support.

4320(i)

In re Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705 – Established that a court should not terminate spousal support for failure to become self-supporting unless the supported spouse was given a fair advance warning (now known as a “Gavron warning”) that they were expected to make reasonable efforts toward self-sufficiency within a reasonable time.
In re Marriage of Aninger (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 230 – Held that a supported spouse who incurred debt far beyond her means (purchasing an expensive home with a large mortgage) had “failed to make a reasonable effort to become self-supporting.” The court refused to increase spousal support, reasoning that a supported spouse cannot expect the payor to subsidize unwise financial decisions that impede the goal of becoming self-sufficient.
In re Marriage of Heistermann (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1195 – Reversed a trial court’s order terminating support merely because a period of time had elapsed. The Court of Appeal emphasized that the passage of time alone is not a sufficient change of circumstance to end spousal support, especially absent evidence that the supported party can actually be self-supporting. Unless the supported spouse was made aware of an obligation to become self-sufficient (and is reasonably capable of it), support should not be cut off solely for not becoming self-supporting within a set time.
In re Marriage of Schaffer (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 801 – Upheld the termination of long-term spousal support after approximately 15 years and multiple review hearings, where the supported spouse still had not become self-sufficient. The court noted that a supported spouse cannot make choices that undermine becoming self-supporting (for example, pursuing an unrealistically low-paying career or mismanaging finances) and then “expect the supporting spouse to pick up the tab.” This decision reinforced that courts will ultimately cease support if the spouse has had a reasonable opportunity to become self-supporting but fails to do so.
In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43 – Discussed the importance of the statutory self-support objective and the use of a Gavron warning. In this case (involving a 23-year marriage), the court terminated spousal support but acknowledged that the supported spouse had not been expressly warned earlier to become self-sufficient. The opinion explained that a “Gavron warning” – an advisement to the supported party to make reasonable efforts toward self-support – is often given when support is ordered (now codified in Fam. Code §4330(b)). It also recognized that what constitutes a “reasonable period” for becoming self-supporting may vary: generally it is one-half the length of a short-term marriage, but in marriages of long duration or where the spouse needs significant retraining, the court may allow a longer timeframe while still expecting diligent efforts toward self-sufficiency.
In re Marriage of Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1225 – Held that when an initial spousal support order is made with the expectation that the supported party will become self-supporting (for example, by pursuing education, training, or employment), the failure to fulfill that expectation can constitute a material change of circumstances. In Shaughnessy, the supported spouse’s decision to abandon the career plan that was anticipated at the time of the divorce was deemed a change in circumstances justifying a reduction in support. The ruling underscores §4320’s policy that the supported spouse must make good-faith efforts toward self-sufficiency, and if those efforts are unreasonably delayed or abandoned, the court may appropriately reduce or terminate support.
In re Marriage of West (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 240 – The trial court in West used the guideline from §4320 (the goal of self-support generally within one-half the marriage length) to set a step-down in spousal support, planning to end support after about 10 years for a 20-year marriage. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that Family Code §4320(l) (now §4320(i)) articulates a legislative goal that a supported spouse should become self-supporting within a reasonable time and that half the length of the marriage is a useful guidepost. However, the appellate court reversed the termination of support in this case, finding that an automatic cutoff was not justified without sufficient evidence of changed circumstances. West confirms that while courts must consider the self-support goal and may use the “half the length of the marriage” benchmark, they retain discretion to extend support in a long-term marriage if the supported spouse has not yet achieved self-sufficiency despite reasonable efforts. It emphasizes that the statutory goal of self-support is an important factor, but not an inflexible rule that trumps all other equitable considerations in a spousal support decision.

4320(j)

In re Marriage of Cauley (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1100 – The Court of Appeal invalidated a non-modifiable spousal support agreement that required a domestic violence victim to pay support to her abusive ex-spouse. Enforcing such support was deemed to violate California’s public policy against domestic violence, especially given the statutory presumption against awarding spousal support to a convicted abuser.
In re Marriage of MacManus (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 330 – The court confirmed that documented history of domestic violence could be considered in spousal support decisions, even for temporary or retroactive support orders. In this case, evidence of the husband’s abuse was admissible and weighed under the §4320 factors, effectively allowing the trial court to deny or limit support due to the abusive conduct.
In re Marriage of Freitas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059 – The Court of Appeal upheld termination of a spousal support award to a spouse who had a domestic violence conviction. The court emphasized the Family Code §4325 presumption (linked to §4320’s DV factor) that an abusive spouse is not entitled to support, and found no abuse of discretion in ending support in light of the documented DV history.
In re Marriage of Priem (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 505 – The court affirmed denial of spousal support to a wife who pleaded nolo contendere to domestic battery against her husband. The wife’s conviction (even via no-contest plea) triggered a rebuttable presumption that she was ineligible for support, and she failed to rebut it. The court reasoned that the law seeks to prevent a victim from being forced to finance their own abuse.
In re Marriage of Kelkar (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 833 – Here the wife had a pre-2002 domestic violence conviction but was receiving spousal support under a stipulated judgment. The Court of Appeal applied the domestic violence factor retroactively, holding that Family Code §4325 (and §4320(j)’s policy) justified terminating her support despite the prior agreement. The court concluded that the strong public policy against domestic violence outweighed any interest in enforcing the original support deal.
In re Marriage of Schu (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 470 – The appellate court upheld a denial of spousal support based on the husband’s evidence of the wife’s abusive conduct toward him and their children. It clarified that California’s “no-fault” divorce rule does not bar consideration of domestic violence under §4320(j). In fact, the law expressly makes a history of interspousal or child-directed abuse a factor, and in this case the wife’s severe emotional and physical abuse fully warranted zero support.
In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481 – The Court of Appeal affirmed that even non-physical forms of domestic abuse can bar an award of spousal support. In this case, the wife’s conviction for stalking and harassing her husband invoked the Family Code §4325 presumption against support. The court rejected the argument that the presumption only applies to “violent” abuse, noting that “abuse” under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act includes behaviors like threats, harassment, and disturbing the peace – sufficient to justify denying spousal support to the abusive spouse.

4320(k)

In re Marriage of Cauley (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1100 – The Court of Appeal applied the statutory presumption (now in Family Code § 4325) that an abusive spouse convicted of domestic violence is not entitled to spousal support. In Cauley, the wife’s domestic violence conviction led the court to terminate her support, emphasizing that forcing a victim to finance their own abuse is against public policy.
In re Marriage of Freitas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059 – The husband in Freitas had a prior domestic violence conviction, yet had initially been awarded temporary spousal support. The appellate court upheld terminating his support under § 4320(k)/4325, rejecting his argument that no “change of circumstances” was shown. The court held that the conviction triggered the presumption against support, which outweighed the usual requirement of changed circumstances. This affirmed that even if the conviction was known when support was first ordered, a trial court can later cut off spousal support to prevent an abusive spouse from being supported.
In re Marriage of Priem (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 505 – The wife in Priem had multiple domestic violence convictions (including no-contest pleas) for abusing her husband. The Court of Appeal affirmed that she was “statutorily ineligible to receive spousal support” due to her history of domestic violence. The court explicitly noted that Family Code § 4320(k) (incorporating § 4325) required consideration of the abusive spouse’s conviction, reflecting a legislative intent that victims should not be forced to support their abusers. The wife’s argument that her no-contest plea couldn’t be used as evidence failed; the conviction still invoked the presumption against awarding her support.
In re Marriage of Kelkar (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 833 – In Kelkar, the husband sought to terminate spousal support because his ex-wife had a domestic violence conviction (from before the spousal support judgment). The Court of Appeal held that Family Code § 4320(k)/4325 applied retroactively and trumped the parties’ prior agreement. The court allowed the support termination, finding that neither res judicata nor waiver barred the application of the § 4325 presumption. Kelkar underscores that even a pre-existing support order can be modified to zero when an abusive spouse’s conviction comes to light, given California’s strong policy against compelling a victim to support their abuser:.
In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481 – Here, the wife was convicted of domestic violence (for stalking and related acts against her husband). The trial court denied her any spousal support, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The wife had not overcome the rebuttable presumption against support for a convicted abuser. The appellate decision clarified that to rebut the presumption, the convicted spouse must present **documented evidence** of being a victim of the other’s abuse (e.g. records, messages, police or medical reports); mere self-serving testimony is insufficient. Because the wife in Brewster & Clevenger offered no such corroborating evidence of her own victimhood, the court found § 4320(k) dispositive and left her spousal support at $0.

4320(l)

In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437 – A landmark California Supreme Court decision holding that a court may not set a fixed termination date for spousal support in a long-term marriage absent clear evidence the supported spouse will be self-supporting by that date. In Morrison, the high court found an abuse of discretion where the trial court terminated jurisdiction after an 11-year period in a 28-year marriage without proof the wife could meet her financial needs by then, emphasizing that support should not be arbitrarily cut off in a lengthy marriage.
In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491 – A Court of Appeal case illustrating broad judicial discretion under §4320. In Baker, a 7-year “short” marriage, the trial court ordered indefinite spousal support with no termination date or step-down, and the appellate court upheld that as proper. The husband’s argument that support must end by half the marriage length was rejected – the court stressed that any future reduction must be based on evidence, not speculation, and even a marriage under 10 years can be treated as “long duration” if circumstances warrant. The court noted that without a material change of circumstances, the support order could later be modified if it becomes “just and equitable” to do so.
In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43 – This case underscores the equitable principle that a supported spouse must be given fair notice and opportunity to become self-sufficient before support is terminated. The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s order ending spousal support for a 23-year marriage, finding an abuse of discretion where the wife’s income was imputed without giving her a “Gavron” warning (advance warning to find employment). The court recognized that “before spousal support can be terminated or reduced, the supported spouse…must be given fair notice of the expectation of self-sufficiency and a reasonable opportunity to achieve such a goal”. In other words, equity and §4320(l)’s catch-all allow considering lack of notice as a factor, making it unjust to abruptly terminate support.
In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191 – A Court of Appeal decision affirming a nuanced spousal support order that incorporated future step-downs and a termination date, reflecting the trial court’s discretion to weigh all §4320 factors (including the goal of self-support) in an equitable manner. In Ackerman – a 10-year marriage – the trial court set high initial support but built in graduated reductions over several years and an end date, premised on the wife’s expected progress toward employment (e.g. passing the bar exam and obtaining work). The order explicitly allowed modification if those assumptions did not materialize. The Court of Appeal upheld this plan, noting the judge properly considered the marital standard of living as a reference and the public policy goal that the supported party become self-supporting within a reasonable time. The decision illustrates that under §4320(l)’s “just and equitable” catch-all, courts have latitude to craft fair support arrangements – including step-down provisions – so long as they are grounded in evidence and all relevant circumstances.
In re Marriage of West (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 240 – A case applying §4320’s factors on a support *modification* in a long-term (20-year) marriage. The trial court in West had reduced and scheduled termination of the ex-wife’s support, reasoning that under §4320(l) the supported spouse should become self-supporting in about half the marriage length (approximately 10 years). The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was error to give weight to the “half the length of the marriage” guideline in this long-duration marriage. Section 4320(l) explicitly says the half-length rule generally does **not** apply to marriages of long duration, and the appellate court found that factor “inapplicable” in a 20-year marriage. The decision reaffirms that in long-term marriages, a court must base support duration on the parties’ circumstances and all equitable factors – not a short-term rule of thumb – and that nothing in §4320 limits the court’s discretion to order support for a longer (or shorter) period as justice requires.

4320(m)

In re Marriage of Cauley (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1100 – A wife’s spousal support was terminated after she was convicted of domestic violence (aggravated stalking) against her husband. The Court of Appeal upheld the termination, emphasizing the strong public policy embodied in §4325 that a domestic violence victim should not be forced to financially support their abuser. The court found that the wife had not rebutted the presumption against support for an abusive spouse, and prior non-modifiable support agreements did not bar applying this policy.
In re Marriage of MacManus (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 330 – The appellate court confirmed that a documented history of domestic violence is a crucial factor when allocating or modifying support. Here, the husband’s felony spousal abuse conviction was considered in reducing his support, consistent with §4320(m) and the §4325 presumption against supporting an abusive spouse. The court affirmed that introducing evidence of domestic violence (normally “fault” evidence) is allowed by statute and found no abuse of discretion in denying or reallocating support under these circumstances.
In re Marriage of Freitas (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1059 – In this case the husband, who had a domestic violence conviction for abusing his wife, initially received temporary spousal support, but the trial court later terminated that support under §4325’s rebuttable presumption against awarding support to an abusive spouse. The husband argued no “change of circumstances” since the conviction was known at the outset, but the Court of Appeal rejected that argument and upheld the termination of support. It ruled that the conviction itself was sufficient grounds to end spousal support, reflecting the legislative intent that abusers should not be subsidized by their victims.
In re Marriage of Priem (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 505 – The wife in this case had a documented history of domestic abuse against her husband (multiple incidents, police reports, and several convictions). The trial court found she was “statutorily ineligible” for spousal support due to that history, invoking §4325’s presumption that spousal support to a convicted domestic abuser is inappropriate. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of support to the abusive wife, noting that her prior no-contest plea to a DV charge and extensive abuse record created a presumption against support which she failed to overcome. This decision underscored that §4320(m) and related provisions reflect a policy that victims need not finance their own abuse.
In re Marriage of Kelkar (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 833 – In this case, the wife had pleaded no contest to domestic violence against the husband before §4325 was enacted, yet the husband later sought to terminate her spousal support after §4325 became law. The Court of Appeal held that §4325’s presumption against support for an abusive spouse applied retroactively to the wife’s conviction, despite a prior stipulated support judgment. The stipulated support was modifiable due to the strong public policy against supporting abusers, and doctrines like res judicata or waiver did not prevent application of §4320(m) and §4325 in these circumstances. Thus, the termination of the abusive wife’s spousal support was affirmed.
In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 481 – The wife in this dissolution had multiple criminal convictions for domestic violence against her husband. The trial court denied her any spousal support, finding she could not overcome the §4325 presumption against support for an abusive spouse. On appeal, the court affirmed the denial of support, concluding that substantial evidence showed the wife’s violence and its impact, and that under §4320(i) and (m) the documented domestic violence (including emotional harm to the husband) warranted zero support. This case illustrates the modern application of §4320(m), where the courts give significant weight to a spouse’s domestic violence conviction and related abuse in deciding that an abusive spouse should receive no spousal support.

4320(n)

In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 491 – A short-duration (7-year) marriage where the trial court ordered indefinite spousal support with no termination date. The Court of Appeal upheld this as within the court’s discretion, noting it would be “just and equitable” not to speculate about when the supported spouse might become self-sufficient. The court refused to set a future cutoff absent evidence the spouse could meet her needs by that date:.
In re Marriage of Zywiciel (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1078 – Emphasized that a permanent support award must result from a fresh weighing of all §4320 factors, rather than simply carrying over a temporary support amount. The appellate court reversed a support order because the trial judge had effectively relied on a computer-generated temporary support figure (DissoMaster) instead of independently evaluating each factor. While the amount and duration of temporary support may be considered under §4320(n) as an “any other” circumstance, the court may not use it as a shortcut to avoid a full equitable analysis.
In re Marriage of Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1225 – Approved the trial court’s use of its equitable discretion to factor in monetary gifts the supported wife was receiving from her parents when modifying spousal support. The wife had been given $20,000 per year by her parents, and the Court of Appeal held it was within the court’s discretion under §4320(n) to treat those recurring gifts as an additional resource available to the supported party. This “just and equitable” factor supported reducing and ultimately terminating the support, since the wife had other financial support beyond her own earnings.
In re Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1467 – Illustrates the court’s broad equitable discretion to end support when a supported spouse fails to pursue self-sufficiency. Here, the supported wife chose to enroll in a lengthy doctoral program instead of completing a shorter vocational program (an MSW) that would have led to a well-paying job. The Court of Appeal affirmed reducing her support to zero, finding her choices had impeded her ability to become self-supporting. Under §4320(n), the court viewed the wife’s voluntary educational decision as an “other factor” affecting equity – essentially, a circumstance justifying termination of spousal support when the supported spouse does not make reasonable efforts toward financial independence.
In re Marriage of Schu (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 470 – Although California is a no-fault divorce state, this case shows that under §4320(n) a court may consider egregious misconduct as an equitable factor in denying spousal support. In Schu, the wife had engaged in years of abusive behavior (including conduct constituting domestic violence and even criminal acts). The trial court denied her any spousal support, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the denial was justified by “any other factors” the court deemed just and equitable. In other words, the wife’s wrongful conduct – while not one of the enumerated factors except as related to domestic violence – fell under §4320(n) and warranted zero support in light of the case’s equities.

Full Text of Family Code § 4320

(a) In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances:
(1) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following:
(A) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment.
(B) The extent to which the supported party’s present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties.

(b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party.

(c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting party’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living.

(d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage.

(e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party.

(f) The duration of the marriage.

(g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the party.

(h) The age and health of the parties.

(i) All documented evidence of any history of domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211, between the parties or perpetrated by either party against either party’s child, including, but not limited to, consideration of:
(1) A plea of nolo contendere.
(2) Emotional distress resulting from domestic violence perpetrated against the supported party by the supporting party.
(3) Any history of violence against the supporting party by the supported party.
(4) Issuance of a protective order after a hearing pursuant to Section 6340.
(5) A finding by a court during the pendency of a divorce, separation, or child custody proceeding, or other proceeding under Division 10 (commencing with Section 6200), that the spouse has committed domestic violence.

(j) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.

(k) The balance of the hardships to each party.

(l) The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. Except in the case of a marriage of long duration as described in Section 4336, a “reasonable period of time” for purposes of this section generally shall be one-half the length of the marriage. However, nothing in this section is intended to limit the court’s discretion to order support for a greater or lesser length of time, based on any of the other factors listed in this section, Section 4336, and the circumstances of the parties.

(m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spouse shall be considered in making a reduction or elimination of a spousal support award in accordance with Section 4324.5 or 4325.

(n) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable.

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