Significant Family Law Cases

Aloy v. Mash (1985) 38 Cal.3d 413

Facts: The plaintiff, Marcella G. Aloy, filed a legal malpractice action against her former attorney, Eugene A. Mash. Mash had represented Aloy in her 1971 dissolution proceeding and did not assert a community property interest in her husband’s vested federal military retirement pension. Mash’s defense was that in 1971, the law regarding the community property character of federal military pensions was “unsettled”. He claimed to have made an “informed judgment” to not pursue the claim, based on his reliance on the 1941 case *French v. French*. Aloy presented evidence that attorneys in her region typically did claim such interests at the time and that Mash had not conducted thorough research or considered federal preemption. The trial court granted summary judgment for Mash, accepting his “informed judgment” defense.
Issue: Whether an attorney commits actionable legal malpractice by failing to assert a claim due to a mistaken assessment of the law, when the law at the time was “unsettled”.
Holding: Yes. The Supreme Court of California reversed the summary judgment. The court held that an attorney’s failure to assert a potentially valid claim, even in an unsettled area of law, may be actionable as malpractice if the attorney’s decision was not based on “informed judgment” derived from adequate research.
Reasoning: The court held that the “unsettled law” defense does not provide blanket immunity. The critical issue is not whether the attorney’s prediction of the law was correct, but whether the judgment was *informed* by adequate research and diligence. The court explicitly distinguished this case from *Davis v. Damrell*, where the attorney was protected after demonstrating “comprehensive knowledge and research” on the issue. Here, Mash “failed to do” the necessary research or make a “rational professional judgment based on all available data”. The court also dismissed Mash’s argument that the claim was inherently invalid (and thus caused no damage) because of the subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision in *McCarty v. McCarty*. The court noted that *McCarty* was not retroactively applied and was, in any event, later nullified by federal legislation, underscoring that the harm was the loss of the client’s opportunity to litigate or settle the claim at the time of the divorce.

In re Marriage of Andreen (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 667

Facts: After a 27-year marriage, the parties (husband, 50; wife, 49) sought dissolution. The husband was a superior court judge, and the wife was a former teacher who had not worked since 1969. The trial court ordered the husband to pay spousal support of $500 per month for five years, followed by $1 per month for the next five years, after which both support and the court’s jurisdiction would automatically terminate. Both parties appealed the financial provisions. Evidence also showed the husband had used $2,250 of community funds to pay taxes related to his separate property income.
Issues: (1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding $500 per month for spousal support? (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering an automatic termination of jurisdiction after ten years? (3) Did the trial court err by failing to require the husband to reimburse the community for his separate tax obligations paid with community funds?.
Holding: Yes, on all three issues. The Court of Appeal reversed the $500 per month award and the automatic termination, finding both to be an abuse of discretion. It also held the trial court erred in failing to charge the husband’s share for the separate tax payment.
Reasoning: (1) A trial court’s discretion, while broad, is abused when it “accords to one spouse a continued standard of living significantly higher than it accords to the other”. The $500 per month award was an abuse because it “pushed the wife’s standard of living considerably below the husband’s” after a long-term marriage. (2) The automatic termination of jurisdiction was an abuse of discretion. Given the 27-year marriage, the wife’s age (49), and her health, there was “no assurance that wife will be self-supporting in 1984”. A court cannot terminate jurisdiction based on mere speculation about a spouse’s future self-sufficiency. (3) The court held that when a spouse “utilizes community funds to pay taxes relating to his separate property income he must reimburse the community for such sums”. The trial court erred by failing to charge the husband’s share of the community property for the $2,250 withdrawn.

In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446

Facts: The wife (Marcia) and husband (Lawrence) dissolved their marriage. During the marriage, the wife worked while the husband attended law school. They purchased a family residence with a $16,500 down payment from the wife’s separate property, with the remainder of the loan paid with community funds. The husband subsequently became a 5% shareholder in a corporate law firm. The wife appealed the trial court’s characterization and valuation of these assets, including the exclusion of goodwill from the law firm valuation and the classification of the husband’s legal education.
Issues: (1) Did the trial court err by classifying the husband’s legal education as not being a community asset, while classifying the educational loan as a community obligation? (2) Did the trial court err by *excluding* the factor of goodwill when valuing the husband’s 5% stock interest in his corporate law firm? (3) Did the trial court properly apportion the separate and community property interests in the family residence?.
Holding: The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment on all challenged points, finding no error.
Reasoning: (1) Citing the precedent *Todd v. Todd*, the court affirmed that a professional degree “cannot be treated as a divisible community asset”. This ruling, which also found the student loan to be a community obligation, highlighted a legal inequity that the legislature would later address with Family Code § 2641 (reimbursement for education). (2) The court found “substantial evidence” to support the trial court’s exclusion of goodwill from the valuation of the husband’s law firm interest. This finding was based on two key factors: the “terms of the stock purchase agreement” (which presumably excluded goodwill in its buy-out valuation) and the husband’s “limited contribution to the firm’s goodwill,” given his recent admission as a shareholder. (3) The court affirmed the trial court’s residence apportionment, which had properly traced the wife’s separate property down payment and calculated the community and separate interests in the property’s appreciation.

In re Marriage of Aylesworth (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 869

Facts: The wife (Nancy) filed a motion in 1976 to modify a 1971 dissolution judgment, seeking increases in both child and spousal support. At the modification hearing, the evidence showed the husband (John) had a net worth over $1 million and a net after-tax income of approximately $22,500 per month. In contrast, the wife’s “fortunes [had] declined drastically” and she was in a “deficit financial position”. The trial court granted a large increase in child support (from $1,300 to $3,600 per month) but *refused* to modify the spousal support agreement. The wife appealed the refusal to modify spousal support.
Issue: Did the trial court err by refusing to modify spousal support, despite the significant change in the parties’ financial circumstances?.
Holding: No. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. The spousal support agreement was non-modifiable, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify it, regardless of the parties’ changed circumstances.
Reasoning: The court’s decision rested entirely on the original Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA). The MSA contained a “nonmodifiable clause”. This clause fulfilled the exception requirement of Civil Code § 4811, subdivision (b), which permits parties to expressly agree that spousal support shall be non-modifiable. Citing *Tilghman v. Superior Court*, the court held that a trial court, having approved an MSA with such a clause, “cannot… make the payments modifiable without permission of the parties”. This case illustrates that a “nonmodifiable” clause is ironclad and will be enforced even in the face of extreme financial changes that would otherwise easily meet the “changed circumstances” standard for modification. The case is also cited as a benchmark for the highly deferential “abuse of discretion” standard for support orders, defined as “whether any judge could have reasonably made the challenged order”.

In re Marriage of Baragry (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 444

Facts: The husband (Richard) and wife (Barbara) married in 1956. In August 1971, following a quarrel, the husband moved out of the family home and into an apartment with his girlfriend. However, for the next *four years*, the husband maintained significant ties: he ate dinner at the family home most days, had his wife do his laundry, used the family home as his official address, filed joint tax returns, paid all family and household expenses, and attended social and work events with his wife as a couple. They did not have sexual relations, but the wife hoped for reconciliation. On October 14, 1975, the husband filed for divorce.
Procedural History: The husband claimed the date of separation was August 1971, which would make his earnings since that date his separate property. The wife argued the date of separation was October 1975. The trial court set the date as August 1971, and the wife appealed.
Issue: What is the legal date of separation? Specifically, does a physical separation constitute a legal separation (“living separate and apart”) when the parties continue to maintain significant financial, social, and domestic ties?.
Holding: The Court of Appeal reversed. The court held that the legal date of separation was October 14, 1975, the date the husband filed for dissolution. Therefore, the husband’s earnings during the 1971-1975 period remained community property.
Reasoning: The court held that the “date of separation” requires a “complete and final break in the marital relationship”. This is not determined merely by a party’s subjective intent or by the fact that they “live in separate residences”. The husband’s “continued involvement in family life, joint financial activities, and maintenance of a marital facade” (e.g., filing joint tax returns, attending events as a couple) was objective conduct inconsistent with a “complete and final break”. The court concluded that the husband’s actions did not legally separate him from his wife, and therefore there was “no sufficient evidence to rebut the presumptive status of a legal marriage continuing” until the 1975 petition was filed.

Beam v. Bank of America (1971) 6 Cal.3d 12

Facts: In a 29-year marriage, the husband (A. Walter Beam) inherited $1.6 million, which was his separate property. He was not employed during the marriage; instead, he “devoted his time to handling his sizable separate estate,” actively trading stocks and engaging in real estate ventures. Over the 29 years, the estate’s value increased only “modestly” to $1.85 million. All of the family’s substantial living expenses (totaling $24,000 per year) were paid from the income generated by the husband’s separate estate.
Wife’s Claim: The wife (Mrs. Beam) appealed the trial court’s finding of no community property. She argued that the court “failed adequately to compensate the community for income attributable to the husband’s skill, efforts and labors” (under the *Pereira*/*Van Camp* apportionment formulas). She also argued that community living expenses should not be charged against community income.
Issue: When a spouse’s labor is expended managing a separate property estate, and the community’s living expenses are paid from that estate’s income, how are the community and separate interests apportioned?.
Holding: The Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that no community property (beyond a small, undisputed note) had been accumulated from the husband’s efforts.
Reasoning: The court’s holding rests on the “family expense presumption.” This is the long-standing rule that “it is presumed that the expenses of the family are paid from community rather than separate funds”. The court applied this presumption *before* finalizing any apportionment. Even if the *Van Camp* formula were used (which would be most favorable to the wife), it would only allocate a certain amount of the estate’s income to the community as “earnings” (e.g., $17,000 per year). However, the evidence showed the family’s living expenses were $24,000 per year. Because the community expenses ($24,000) exceeded the maximum potential community income ($17,000), “quite obviously there was never any positive balance of community property”. Any community income generated by the husband’s efforts was *consumed* by the community’s living expenses, leaving no community property to divide.

In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1096

Facts: The husband (Douglas) conveyed his community property interest in the couple’s home to his wife (Diane). He claimed he did so in reliance on the wife’s *oral promise* to waive her community property interest in his retirement accounts. The wife denied making the promise, and, critically, there was no “written express declaration” by her transmuting her interest. The husband argued that his “part performance” (conveying the house) made the oral agreement enforceable, despite the statute.
Procedural History: The trial court ruled in the husband’s favor, finding that his part performance of the oral agreement was sufficient to change the character of the retirement accounts. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issue: Can the equitable doctrine of “part performance” be used as an exception to the strict “written express declaration” requirement of California Family Code § 852(a) for a valid property transmutation?.
Holding: No. The Supreme Court of California (Opinion by Baxter, J.) reversed. The court held that Family Code § 852(a) requires a “written express declaration” and that “part performance of an oral agreement **does not** satisfy this statutory requirement”.
Reasoning: The court emphasized that the legislature enacted § 852(a) to create certainty and “reduce excessive litigation, unreliable evidence, and incentives for perjury”. The statute is not a standard statute of frauds, which has many equitable exceptions. Rather, it is a rule of *validity* (“is not valid unless…”). The statute requires a clear writing by the “spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected”. Citing *Estate of MacDonald*, the court reaffirmed that the writing must *explicitly state* that a change in character or ownership is being made. The court found no legislative intent to incorporate exceptions like part performance, and allowing such an exception would “defeat the legislative intent” and reintroduce the very uncertainty the statute was designed to cure.

In re Marriage of Birnbaum (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1508

Facts: A dissolution judgment incorporated an agreement giving the parents (Lorene and Ira) joint legal and joint physical custody of their three daughters. The judgment specified a detailed “coparenting residential arrangement” (i.e., the parenting schedule). Subsequently, the trial court modified this living arrangement. The mother appealed, contending that the trial court erred by modifying the schedule *without* first requiring the father to demonstrate a “significant change of circumstances”.
Issue: When parents share an existing joint physical custody order, does a subsequent modification of the “coparenting residential arrangement” (parenting schedule) constitute a “change of custody” that requires the moving party to satisfy the “changed circumstance” rule?.
Holding: No. The Court of Appeal (Opinion by King, J.) affirmed the modification order. It held that “when parents have joint physical custody… an order modifying the coparenting residential arrangement **does not constitute a change of custody**”. The “changed circumstance” rule *does not apply* to a modification request seeking only a change in the parenting schedule.
Reasoning: The court established a critical two-tier standard for custody modifications. The “changed circumstance” rule—which is a high burden designed to protect “the weighty interest in stable custody arrangements”—applies only to a request for a change in a *final determination of custody* (e.g., changing from joint custody to sole custody, or from one parent’s sole custody to the other’s). However, in an existing joint physical custody arrangement, modifying the *schedule* (the residential arrangement) is not a change in the *custody* status itself. Therefore, the standard for modifying the schedule is not the “changed circumstance” rule, but simply the “best interest” of the child, reviewed under the trial court’s “very broad discretion”.

In re Marriage of Bonvino (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1411

Facts: The husband (Frank) purchased a home during the marriage, making the down payment with his separate property. The loan for the balance was acquired based on community credit. The wife (Dawnel) signed a quitclaim deed, but the trial court set it aside for undue influence.
Procedural History: The trial court characterized the *entire* property as community property. It then awarded the husband a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement for his separate property down payment under Family Code § 2640. The husband appealed, arguing he should have a proportional ownership interest, not just reimbursement.
Issue: Did the trial court err in classifying the entire property as community and applying § 2640 reimbursement, without first determining if a valid transmutation of the husband’s separate property occurred?.
Holding: Yes. The Court of Appeal reversed. The court held that the husband maintained a separate property interest in the home, and the property had *both* separate and community interests “in proportion to the equity contributions”.
Reasoning: The trial court’s analysis was incorrect. The first step is *characterization*. For the husband’s separate property down payment to become community property, a valid *transmutation* under Family Code § 852(a) is required. The husband “did not sign an express declaration to transmute his separate property to community property”. Therefore, his traceable separate property investment retained its separate character. The property was a *mixed-character* asset. The correct approach was not § 2640 reimbursement (which applies to contributions *to* community property), but *apportionment* using the formulas from *In re Marriage of Moore* and *In re Marriage of Aufmuth*. This ruling “preserv[es] the proportional ownership interests” and prevents a spouse’s separate property investment from being “unintentionally devalued into a mere dollar-for-dollar reimbursement claim”.

In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583

Facts: The parties separated in 1969. Under the law at that time (former Civil Code § 5118), the husband’s earnings while living separate and apart were *community property*, while the wife’s were separate property. On March 4, 1972, *before* the dissolution judgment was final, the statute was amended to make the earnings of *both* spouses separate property while separated.
Procedural History: The trial court applied the new law prospectively only. It ruled that the husband’s earnings acquired between 1969 and the 1972 effective date of the amendment were community property under the *former* law. The husband appealed.
Issue: Whether the 1972 amendment to Civil Code § 5118, which made a spouse’s separated earnings their separate property, should be applied retroactively to characterize a husband’s earnings acquired *before* the statute’s effective date, in a dissolution case that was not yet final.
Holding: Yes. The Supreme Court of California (Opinion by Tobriner, J.) reversed, holding that the amended statute “applied retroactively”.
Reasoning: The court found that while the general presumption is that statutes apply prospectively, that presumption was overcome by evidence of legislative intent for retroactivity. The court then addressed the constitutional due process challenge (i.e., that retroactivity would divest the wife of her “vested” right in the husband’s prior earnings). The court held that retroactive application was a valid exercise of the state’s police power because the *former* law was “patently unfair” and discriminatory based on gender. The state has a compelling interest in “equitable property distribution” and in “redress[ing] retroactively inequitable property rules”. This compelling interest in remedying a “rank injustice” (a gender-based discrimination) was sufficient to overcome any due process concerns about impairing a vested property right.

In re Marriage of Brandes (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1461

Facts: The husband (Charles) founded an investment advisory business (BIP) in 1974, *before* his 1986 marriage. During the 18-year marriage, the business (the husband’s separate property) grew “enormously,” from managing $20 million to $85 *billion*. The trial court was tasked with apportioning the community’s share of this massive increase in value.
Procedural History: The trial court applied a “hybrid” apportionment method. It applied the ***Pereira*** formula (which favors the community, allocating a fair return to separate property and the balance of growth to the community) for the early years, when the husband’s *personal efforts* were the primary driver of growth. It then switched and applied the ***Van Camp*** formula (which favors separate property, allocating the “reasonable value” of the spouse’s services to the community and the balance of growth to separate property) for the later years, when the business’s growth was “primarily attributable to other factors” (e.g., market forces, other employees). The wife (Linda) appealed, arguing the community should own most of BIP.
Issue: In apportioning the growth of a separate property business, is it permissible for a court to use a “hybrid” approach, applying *Pereira* to one period of the marriage and *Van Camp* to another, to reflect the changing nature of the business?.
Holding: Yes. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s novel “hybrid” approach, holding that this method “achieved substantial justice”. This was noted as a “case of first impression”.
Reasoning: The court held that *Pereira* and *Van Camp* are not rigid, all-or-nothing rules, but equitable tools to “achieve substantial justice”. The trial court’s factual finding that the husband’s “role in the business changed during marriage” was key. His efforts were “once the primary driver,” but this was no longer true in the later years. Therefore, applying *Pereira* to the early “personal effort” period and *Van Camp* to the later “capital-driven” period was the most equitable and legally appropriate way to apportion the value.

In re Marriage of Burlini (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 65

Facts: In a dissolution following a 24-year marriage, the wife (Dorothy) challenged the trial court’s order for “permanent” spousal support. She contended the award was an abuse of discretion because it was lower than the amount mandated by the Santa Clara Superior Court’s support schedules. The wife also challenged the court’s refusal to grant an “in-kind” division of the community coin laundry business.
Issues: (1) Can a superior court use a single schedule of guidelines for fixing both *temporary* (pendente lite) and *permanent* (post-judgment) spousal support? (2) Is an “in-kind” division of a community business required?.
Holding: No to both. The Court of Appeal (Opinion by King, J.) affirmed the trial court’s judgment. (1) It held that “one schedule of guidelines for spousal support may not be used for fixing both temporary and permanent spousal support”. (2) It held that an in-kind division of the business was not required.
Reasoning: (1) The court established that the purposes of the two types of support are “far different”. Temporary spousal support is intended “to maintain the living conditions and standards of the parties in as close to the status quo position as possible pending trial”. In contrast, “permanent” spousal support “is not to preserve the preseparation status quo”. It is to provide financial assistance, if appropriate, based on the statutory factors (now Family Code § 4320) and the parties’ circumstances *after* their property has been divided. Therefore, a simple guideline schedule for temporary support cannot be used for the complex, multi-factor analysis required for a permanent award. (2) The award of the entire business to the husband was proper because he was the “key person” who serviced the machines and maintained the business relationships, making an in-kind division unworkable and justifying the award of the asset to one party under the “economic circumstances” exception.

In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751

Facts: A wife (Esther) purchased a home during the marriage and made all mortgage, tax, and maintenance payments from her separate earnings, which she kept in a separate account with her husband’s (Robert) knowledge and consent. However, on a realtor’s advice, title to the home was taken in *joint tenancy*.
Procedural History: At trial, based on the then-current *In re Marriage of Lucas* standard, the court found an enforceable *oral agreement* between the spouses that the home was the wife’s separate property and awarded it to her. While the husband’s appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Civil Code § 4800.1, which stated that the joint tenancy presumption of community property could *only* be rebutted by a *writing*. Esther had no such writing.
Issue: Can § 4800.1, with its new writing requirement, be constitutionally applied retroactively to a pending case, thereby invalidating a judgment based on an oral agreement and divesting the wife of her property right?.
Holding: No. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial court’s judgment for the wife. The court held that retroactive application of § 4800.1 in this case would be an unconstitutional deprivation of a “vested property right without due process of law”.
Reasoning: The court held that under the prior law (*Lucas*), Esther had acquired a vested property right based on the oral agreement. Retroactive application of the new statute would “operate to deprive Esther of” this right and result in a $150,000 “windfall” to the husband, who had contributed nothing to the property. The court *distinguished* this case from *In re Marriage of Bouquet*, where retroactivity was upheld. In *Bouquet*, retroactivity was necessary to cure a “rank injustice” (a gender-discriminatory law). Here, the new statute did *not* cure an injustice; rather, its retroactive application would *create* one by “substantially impair[ing]” Esther’s “legitimate expectations and vested rights” without a sufficiently compelling state interest.

Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531

Facts: An unwed mother (Ana Burchard) was the primary caregiver for her son from birth, while working two jobs and attending nursing school. The father (William Garay) initially denied paternity and only began child support payments after a court order. After a brief, failed attempt to live together, both parents filed for exclusive custody. The child was healthy and well-adjusted under the mother’s care.
Procedural History: The trial court awarded custody to the father. Its decision was based on three considerations: (1) the father was “financially better off,” (2) he had since married, and his new wife could provide care, and (3) he was more willing to allow visitation. The trial court applied the “best interests” test, finding there had been “no prior de facto nor de jure award of custody” to the mother.
Issues: (1) In an *initial* custody determination where no prior order exists, what is the correct standard? (2) Did the trial court err by awarding custody based primarily on the father’s superior economic position and the mother’s need to work?.
Holding: Yes. The Supreme Court of California reversed the custody award. It held that the “changed circumstance” rule does not apply to an initial custody determination; the “best interests” test is the correct standard. However, the trial court “erred in awarding custody to William Garay Sr., as it improperly relied on economic factors and failed to give due weight to the stability and continuity provided by Ana Burchard”.
Reasoning: The Supreme Court held that the “most important” factor in the best interests test is the need for “stability and continuity” in the child’s life, which is provided by the primary caregiver. The trial court’s reliance on the father’s financial advantage was improper and “rests on outmoded notions of a woman’s role in our society”. It created a “double standard” by penalizing the working mother while rewarding the father for care that “someone else” (his new wife) would provide. The court held it was an abuse of discretion to “assum[e] that a working mother provided inferior care” and to disrupt the child’s stable and successful arrangement with his primary caregiver.

In re Marriage of Burkle (Burkle II) (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712

Facts: In 1997, after a dissolution petition had been filed, Ronald and Janet Burkle attempted to reconcile. As part of this effort, they executed a comprehensive postmarital agreement to resolve all present and future financial issues. Both parties were represented by independent counsel. They continued living together until April 2002. In 2003, Janet filed a new petition for dissolution, claiming the 1997 postmarital agreement was void and unenforceable due to undue influence, fraud, and failure of disclosure. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found the agreement valid.
Issues: (1) Does the presumption of undue influence (Family Code § 721) automatically apply to a postmarital agreement where both parties are represented by counsel and obtain “mutually agreeable advantages”? (2) Do the stringent statutory disclosure requirements apply to an agreement executed as part of a reconciliation effort, rather than in “contemplation of imminent dissolution”?.
Holding: No to both. The Court of Appeal affirmed the validity of the agreement. It held that “the presumption of undue influence in interspousal transactions **does not apply** where both parties obtained mutually agreeable advantages”. It also held that the statutory disclosure requirements did not apply in this specific context.
Reasoning: (1) The court, citing *Estate of Cover* (1922), held that the “mere existence of the marriage relation alone” is not sufficient to “support the presumption of undue influence where the transaction… is… shown to be fair and free from any material advantage” to one spouse over the other. Because this was a complex, counseled, bilateral agreement where *both* parties received advantages, the presumption was not triggered. (2) The court held that the statutory disclosure requirements did not apply because the agreement “was not executed in contemplation of imminent dissolution but as part of a reconciliation effort”. (3) Finally, the court noted that Janet had “accepted benefits under the agreement for years before challenging its validity,” invoking the doctrines of ratification and estoppel.

In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso and Faso (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 945

Facts: A wealthy husband (Faso) and wife (Cadwell-Faso) negotiated a premarital agreement. The husband *was represented by counsel* from the outset of the transaction. Multiple drafts of the agreement and its addenda were exchanged. The wife’s attorney faxed the *final* addendum to the husband, and the parties signed it *six days later*.
Procedural History: The husband, the party against whom enforcement was sought, challenged the agreement. He argued it was presumptively involuntary under Family Code § 1615(c)(2), which (as amended in 2002) creates a presumption of involuntariness unless the party had “at least seven calendar days between the time he or she was ‘first presented’ with the agreement… and the time he or she signed”. The trial court agreed with the husband, ruling that “first presented” meant the *final draft*, and because only six days had passed, the addendum was unenforceable.
Issue: Does the seven-day waiting period mandated by § 1615(c)(2) apply to a challenging party who was “represented by counsel from the outset of the transaction”?.
Holding: No. The Court of Appeal reversed. It held that the seven-day waiting period in § 1615(c)(2) “simply does not pertain” (i.e., does not apply) when the party challenging the agreement was represented by independent counsel from the beginning of the negotiation process.
Reasoning: The court concluded, after examining the rules of statutory interpretation, that the legislative intent behind the 2002 amendment was to protect *unrepresented* parties from being ambushed with an agreement on the eve of the wedding. It was not intended to invalidate an agreement for a party who, like the husband here, had his own attorney from the start and had been involved in “multiple drafts” and negotiations.
Critical Subsequent Development: This case’s holding was **superseded by legislation**. The California legislature passed a subsequent act “intended to supersede… the holding in re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso & Faso,” clarifying that the seven-day rule *does* apply to all parties, regardless of legal representation.

Carrieres v. Commissioner (9 Cir 1977) 552 F.2d 1350

Facts: This federal tax case, affirming a decision of the U.S. Tax Court, addressed the tax consequences of a property settlement in a community property state. The case was decided under the law as it existed *prior* to the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (which created IRC § 1041). At the time, the *Davis* rule made property transfers incident to divorce taxable events.
Issue: When divorcing spouses in a community property state make an *unequal* division of community assets, and one spouse uses *separate property* (such as cash or a promissory note) to “equalize” the division, is that transaction a taxable event?.
Holding: Yes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s holding that while an “approximately equal division” of community property *in kind* is a non-taxable partition, “to the extent… that one party receives… separate cash or other separate property… in exchange for portions of his community property, he has **sold or exchanged** such portions and gain, if any, must be recognized”.
Reasoning: The Tax Court identified a non-taxable partition as one where each spouse receives half of each asset, or an equal share of fungible assets, or community assets worth half the total value. The transaction here was different; it was a “bargain and sale”. When one spouse used separate property to *buy out* the other’s interest in a community asset (e.g., a family business), it was treated as a taxable “sale” of that interest.
Critical Subsequent Development: This case’s holding is no longer current tax law. As noted in related analyses, the *Davis* rule and its “bargain and sale” corollary, as exemplified by *Carrieres*, created a “harsh and unexpected tax burden”. Congress “enacted section 1041 to correct these problems”. Under current law (IRC § 1041), transfers between spouses incident to divorce (including buy-outs with separate property) are treated as non-taxable gifts.

Cassel v. Superior Court (Wasserman, Comden, Casselman & Pearson) (2011) 51 Cal.4th 113

Facts: A client, Michael Cassel, agreed to settle his business litigation in mediation. He subsequently sued his attorneys (Wasserman, Comden, etc.) for legal malpractice. Cassel alleged his attorneys “obtained his consent to the settlement through bad advice, deception, and coercion” during the mediation process, causing him to settle for less than the case was worth.
Procedural History: In the malpractice lawsuit, the attorneys moved to *exclude* all evidence of their *private discussions* with Cassel that occurred “during or in preparation for mediation,” citing California’s mediation confidentiality statutes (Evid. Code § 1119 et seq.). The trial court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeal vacated the order, reasoning the statutes did not apply to private attorney-client discussions.
Issue: Do California’s mediation confidentiality statutes, which are intended to protect the candor of mediation, prohibit the admission of private communications between a client and their attorneys in a subsequent legal malpractice lawsuit *against* those attorneys?.
Holding: Yes. The Supreme Court of California held that the mediation confidentiality statutes are “clear and absolute” and *do* bar the admission of such evidence, even in a malpractice suit against the attorneys who participated in the mediation.
Reasoning: The court stated that the statute’s language, which protects *all* communications “for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation”, is absolute and permits no exceptions other than those specified in the statute. The court’s “clear and absolute” interpretation is intended to “encourage the candor necessary to a successful mediation”. The court “rejected the notion of creating a judicial exception” for malpractice claims, stating that any such exceptions “must be crafted by the Legislature”. Justice Chin’s reluctant concurrence noted that this ruling effectively “shielded the acts of attorneys from a malpractice action” for “incompetent or deceptive” advice given during mediation.

In re Marriage of Catalano (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 543

Facts: A wife (Conni) appealed a child support modification order, arguing the increase was too low. The husband’s (Patrick) income had “dramatically increased” since the original 1983 judgment. The case was later cited by other courts for its holdings on imputing income and the nature of child support.
Issues: (1) What is the standard for imputing “earning capacity” to a parent for child support? (2) Can parents make an agreement that limits a court’s ability to modify child support?.
Holding: (1) The court held that an award will not be based on “earning capacity” (as opposed to actual earnings) *unless* “the parent appears to be avoiding his or her responsibilities” **and** “it would be in the child’s best interests to impute the difference”. (2) The court held that child support is a priority for the “children’s best interests,” and any “parents’ agreement limiting [the] court’s ability to modify child support violates [that] priority”.
Reasoning: This case is a key authority for two principles. First, it establishes that child support is a right belonging to the child, and public policy does not permit parents to contractually limit a court’s “ability to modify child support,” as the “best interests of the children” are the “priority”. This stands in contrast to spousal support, which *can* be made non-modifiable. Second, the case provides a key two-prong test for imputing income. A court must find *both* that the parent is avoiding their financial responsibilities and that imputing income is in the child’s best interest. This “best interests” component is critical, as it allows a parent to be under-employed if, for example, it is in the child’s best interest for them to be a stay-at-home caregiver.

In re Marriage of Chakko (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 104

Facts: In a post-judgment child support modification proceeding, the father (Jacob Chakko), a self-employed owner of J.C. Industries, Inc., repeatedly refused to comply with discovery requests to determine his true income. However, the father *had* submitted loan applications to finance a $2.5 million house, and on those applications, he *did* state his income.
Procedural History: As a discovery *sanction* for the father’s non-compliance, the trial court issued an “issue sanction” order. This order declared that the father’s income was $40,000 per month (the amount stated on his loan application) and *precluded* him from offering any evidence to the contrary. The father appealed, arguing there was “no substantial evidence” that he earned $40,000 per month.
Issue: (1) Is a statement of income on a loan application “substantial evidence” of income for support purposes? (2) Was the “issue sanction” precluding the father from challenging this figure an abuse of discretion?.
Holding: The Court of Appeal (Opinion by Yegan, J.) affirmed the issue sanction in a scathing opinion. It held that the loan application *is* substantial evidence of income and the sanction was not an abuse of discretion.
Reasoning: The court rejected the father’s appeal, stating he “fails to appreciate the rules on appeal” and “fails to understand that the trial court did not credit his testimony”. The court established that a loan application is “substantial evidence of income” and that a party cannot state a high income to a lender and a low income to the court. The court’s conclusion was: “If these records were good enough to obtain financing for a $2,500,000 house, they are good enough to support the issue sanction order concerning child support”. The court affirmed the sanction as a just consequence for a party who “interfere[s] with the truth-seeking function of the trial court”.

In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83

Facts: In a dissolution proceeding, a central dispute involved the characterization of commingled investment accounts. The husband (Joe) retained a forensic expert who performed a “tracing” analysis, which the trial court accepted, characterizing the assets as the husband’s separate property.
Wife’s Appeal: The wife (DeeDee) appealed, making two primary arguments. (1) She challenged the tracing method, asserting that California law permits *only two exclusive* tracing methods: “direct tracing” and “exhaustion tracing” (family expense tracing), and that the husband’s expert’s method did not conform to either. (2) She argued the permanent spousal support award was unreasonably low given the husband’s substantial income and the high marital standard of living.
Issues: (1) Is a trial court limited to accepting only “direct” or “exhaustion” tracing methods to characterize commingled funds? (2) Did the trial court err in its spousal support award?.
Holding: The Court of Appeal affirmed the tracing but reversed the support award. (1) It *rejected* the wife’s claim, holding that the law does *not* limit tracing to only two exclusive methods. (2) It reversed the spousal support award, finding it was not adequately supported by the record.
Reasoning: (1) The court’s key holding on tracing provided new flexibility. It stated: “Tracing is simply a method of proof… The tracing method may vary depending on the facts.”. Trial courts are “free to consider and credit reasonable, well-supported, and nonspeculative expert testimony” when determining if a party has successfully traced commingled assets. This affirmed the trial court’s discretion to accept a reliable, fact-based tracing method even if it did not fit the two traditional models. (2) The court reversed the support award because the trial court “failed to adequately explain” the low award given the husband’s “substantial income and the parties enjoyed a high marital standard of living”. The trial court also erred by using 2013 tax returns to set 2014 support when 2014 returns were available.

In re Marriage of Cueva (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 290

Facts: The husband (Roberto) appealed from an interlocutory judgment of dissolution, challenging *only* the award of attorney fees to the wife’s (Maria) counsel. The community property estate was valued at approximately $1 million, and the husband, a physician, had a controllable cash flow in 1976 of over $205,000. The trial court awarded the wife’s attorney a total of $21,000. At the hearing, the wife’s counsel suggested a fee of $20,000 would be “acceptable,” and the husband’s attorney (present on a default “as a matter of courtesy”) made “no comment” on the fee request. The trial court then adopted the proposed judgment.
Issue: Was the $21,000 attorney fee award “grossly excessive” and an “abuse of discretion,” where the record lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for the amount?.
Holding: Yes. The Court of Appeal reversed the fee award. While the motion for fees “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” that discretion is not unlimited, and the determination must be based on evidence.
Reasoning: This case is the foundational authority for the “major factors” a court *must* consider in fixing reasonable attorney fees. These factors include: “the attorney’s hourly billing rate; the nature and difficulty of the litigation; the skill required and employed…; the amount of fees and costs incurred…; [and] the attorney’s experience”. In this case, the record was silent on these factors. The trial court’s award was based on little more than the attorney’s own request. An award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence in the record. A trial court cannot simply “rubber stamp” an attorney’s request without an evidentiary basis (like time records, a declaration, or testimony) that addresses the factors required to determine a “reasonable” fee.

In re Marriage of Damico (1994) 7 Cal.4th 673

Facts: Appellant Ronald Damico (father) and respondent Mary Damico Austin (mother) were married in 1958 and separated less than a year later. A son was born in 1958. A 1960 judgment of divorce ordered the father to pay child support. He paid support for a short time, “then stopped under circumstances that are disputed”. The father’s defense for non-payment was presumably that the mother had concealed the child, interfering with his visitation rights.
Issue: Whether a custodial parent’s (mother’s) “concealment” of the child, which interferes with the non-custodial parent’s (father’s) visitation, can be asserted as an “estoppel” defense against the collection of child support arrears. This case is a key part of the line of jurisprudence that includes *Mofat v. Moffat*.
Holding: The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed. (The provided research materials do not state the specific holding or reasoning of the *Damico* opinion itself, but rather confirm its facts and its relation to the *Mofat* concealment doctrine).

In re Marriage of Brooks and Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176

Facts: During their marriage, a husband (Brooks) and wife (Robinson) purchased a home. The down payment came from the husband’s community property earnings. Because it would be “easier to obtain financing,” the husband “agreed that title would be held in Robinson’s name”. The grant deed listed the wife as “ANNIKKAWA A. ROBINSON, a Single Woman”. The wife later sold the property to a third-party bona fide purchaser (ECG) without the husband’s knowledge or consent.
Husband’s Claim: The husband sued to set aside the sale. He argued that the property was community and that placing it in the wife’s name as separate property was an attempted *transmutation* that was invalid under Family Code § 852(a) for lack of a “written express declaration”.
Issue: Does the transmutation statute (§ 852) apply when community funds are used to *acquire* property from a third party in one spouse’s name, or does the “form of title” presumption (Evidence Code § 662) control?.
Holding: The Court of Appeal held that § 852 *does not apply* to initial acquisitions from third parties. It found this was not an “interspousal transaction” but a purchase “from a third person”. Therefore, the “form of title” presumption of Evidence Code § 662 controlled, making the property the wife’s separate property.
Reasoning: The court found “no facts suggesting a transmutation” because the property “was acquired in [the wife’s] name in a transaction with a third person, not through an interspousal transaction”. Because the husband agreed to this form of title, the property was presumptively the wife’s separate property, and she had the right to sell it.
Critical Subsequent Development: This case’s holding was **abrogated** by the California Supreme Court in ***In re Marriage of Valli*** (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1396. The Supreme Court found the reasoning in *Brooks and Robinson* “not persuasive” and held that § 852 *does* apply to such acquisitions, effectively overruling this case on its primary holding.